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Over
the course of my lifetime the value of intangible property has soared.
The monetary value that is. That is not to say that the value of ideas
is a new concept. All you have to do is look at religion and governmental
systems to understand that mankind has been willing to fight and die for
ideas for a very long time.
In our Constitution the value of ideas even receives constitutional
protection. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of that basic document granted
Congress the powers to enact laws,
| “to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” |
But in the last fifty years things have changed. In our society the
value of copyrights, patents and trademarks has skyrocketed. I’ve heard
stories about drug makers fighting to protect and extend patents on drugs
and on challenges to the length of copyright protection. Recently I was
researching the stock price on a pharmaceutical company. I found that the
price was falling because of concern that the patent on its highly profitable
drug was about to expire and the company was scrambling to develop a replacement.
For comparison, The San Antonio Express-News carried a story about
Schering-Plough which makes the drug Claritin. According to the article
that one product provided 31 percent of sales for the entire company. When
the company decided to switch the medicine to non-prescription sales over
the counter, its stock dropped five percent. Claritin world-wide sales
for 2001 were estimated at $3.1 billion. Although the decision didn’t involve
patents or copyrights, it does indicate how much money is at stake.
That is not unlike the debate in 1998 about the extension of the copyright
period. The holders of major intellectual property rights persuaded Congress
to extend the period by twenty years. A work of an individual may be protected
for 70 years after the person’s death. A work “created” by corporate authors
(actually works created by employees or a work made for hire under a contract
with the corporation) is 95 years. For instance, without the extension
it was argued that the Disney copyright on Mickey Mouse would expire in
2003. (Just to keep it in perspective, Disney’s rights to Mickey Mouse
is not entirely based on copyright law. The rights to use the Mickey Mouse
character would also involve trademark issues.)
In case anyone didn’t understand the impetus for the legislation, it
was dubbed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. (Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) ) which can be found at 17 U.S.C. § 304. Yes,
it was named for the late Congressman who became famous as half of the
Sonny and Cher duo.
I’m sure you realize that the current court fights over Napster and
the other music swapping Web sites aren’t about the sharing of the songs.
The copyright holders want there to be millions and millions of copies
— licensed copies — for which the company has been paid. That income would
contribute to the profitability of the company and help support the celebrity
lifestyles.
Not everybody agrees that the purposes behind the constitutional provision
are to protect the income of the owner. Recently a counter argument has
surfaced and the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear a constitutional
challenge to the Sonny Bono Act. (In legalese: it granted a writ of certiorari
in the case Elred v. Ashcroft.) In effect, the plaintiffs in the
case are arguing that enough is enough. Their contention is that the drafters
of the Constitution had something else in mind.
They argue that the purpose was to foster an exchange of ideas. The
provisions were supposed to restrict the work for only a limited time.
In part they argue that extending the term on existing copyrights stifles
creativity and that nothing is gained by increasing the time after the
author’s death. Consequently, they are asking the Court to rule that Congress
has exceeded its authority by the extension. The Berkman Center for Internet
& Society at Harvard Law School has an excellent site
devoted to the case . The site provides an interesting analogy that
if a child prodigy such as Mozart writes a piece at age five and then lives
for, say 85 years, his works would not have been in the public domain for
150 years. (The Berkman Center is actively supporting the Plaintiffs
in the suit.)
The plaintiff’s petition to the Supreme Court contains this statement
of the case. I’ve deleted the citations but the entire document can be
found online
.
| “The power at issue in this case is also and likewise
constrained. Congress’ power to grant ‘exclusive right[s],’ incident to
the power ‘To promote the Progress of Science,’ is expressly limited by
the text of the Copyright and Patent Clause. It is expressly limited by
the First Amendment. And it is impliedly limited to works that are “original.”
“These limitations were established by the Framers
to assure a rich public domain, and to avoid the temptation to corruption
that state-backed monopolies . . . as the Framers understood copyrights
to be inevitably invite. They thus effected a regime that requires
that monopolies over speech only be granted as a quid pro quo for producing
something new — as this Court described it, for producing something that
“add[s] to the sum of useful knowledge.”
“The question in this case is whether this same
power to grant monopolies as a quid pro quo for creating original works
can also be used to grant monopolies to ‘something already in existence.”
The court below held that it can, finding that extensions of subsisting
terms were constitutional so long as each extension is limited.” |
The plaintiffs have also challenged the Court to rule that the statute
violates the First Amendment.
| “Petitioners have raised a First Amendment challenge
to both the retrospective and prospective aspects of the CTEA. They argue
that both aspects are content neutral regulations of speech and the press,
and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny,
petitioners submit neither the retrospective nor the prospective extension
of the copyright term ‘advances important governmental interests’ without
burdening ‘substantially more speech than necessary.’ ” |
The adoption of computers and the internet has made it easy for widespread
exchange of information. The forthcoming ruling by the Court in the Elred
case will determine how much of that information will be in the public
domain and what will be subject to license fees.
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