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Sometimes you are writing a no-nonsense technical column only to discover,
on reading your e-mail, that you can distort your already grotesque anatomy
by two more orders of magnitude. “While I walk in the alley of the shadow
of death, yet I fear not, since I am the biggest **** in the alley.”
Shooting spammers first requires that one finds them, and this proposition
is complicated by their being physically situated in Brungaria, Itchistan,
Lower Slobbovia, etc. So we settle for electronic countermeasures, which
fall short, partly because fools are so ingenious. Spam filters are too
little, too late. We have to get them before their submission even arrives
at their server, much less ours. So I hereby create a new acronym: NOOI
(National Opt-Out
Infrastructure).
In this, there are two classes of e-mail recipients, those subscribing
to the services of the infrastructure and everyone else, which presently
means you. Subscribers only accept mail from other subscribers, and the
mail between these parties follows a collection of very strict rules, which
the recipient can enable and disable to their tastes.
Some of these rules are easy, such as a ‘reply-to’ domain that agrees
with the sender’s IP address. The more subtle ones require that the sender
not have any embedded scripts; does not use animated GIFs, does not use
the word ‘Free’, and limits their message to what could reasonably fit
on one screen. The sender is alerted by their own e-mail software that
the messages they are posting are rejected when they fail to meet criteria:
these are expressed in ‘Average Probability of Delivery’, which means that
out of e-mail accounts generally only Y out of X will accept this particular
message. If the APD is low (say below 10%), then the sender goes through
the more complicated scan of SPD (Specific
Probability of
Delivery) where
the list of intended addressees is checked. The sender is informed that
90% of the receivers reject the message because of false headers, 60% reject
due to the presence of the phase ‘Russian Women’, and 99.8% reject due
to the presence of script triggered by an embedded HTML ‘Submit’ button.
There are several strategies the sender can employ to get the probability
of delivery raised. First is to offer something that people are actually
interested in. This presumes the presence of enough intelligence on the
part of the sender to be concerned with their audience’s needs and interests.
The remaining 90% that are still clueless use the subterfuges: ‘F R
E Ee’, ‘Bonus bingo’, ‘Belarus and Tajikistan’, ‘Die mands’, etc. The hustle
is a bit cuter. However, as readers start right-clicking on the header
and selecting the ‘Reject’ option, the rapidly rising resistance to reception
effectively votes the sender ‘off the island’. It still takes awhile to
send an economically significant amount of spam, and the protest votes
cut it off at the pass.
The ‘body filters’ are looking for ‘Platinum Card’, ‘Newt Gingrich’,
‘Trial Subscription’, etc. and discarding anything that is either too long
to keep the readers attention, contains words and phases that the reader
is already tired of receiving, or seems to contain a lot of tortured spelling
and grammatical constructions.
Certain senders are, needless to say, exempted, such as immediate family
members and working associates. Another layer of senders is given the benefit
of the doubt, since their original transmissions were acceptable and their
subsequent messages have proven trustworthy. As correspondence continues,
the receiver can unblock messages with various kinds of attachments, various
questionable words and phrases, and so on.
Another test is the longevity of the sender’s account. Those that are
less than two weeks old can be held until a statistically significant number
of other subscribers get messages they like. ‘Held’ messages may stay that
way for months, if the sender’s address raises more than a trivial number
of validation issues. Identical sender addresses that seem to simultaneously
condense out of multiple disparate providers are blocked by a recipient
community that doesn’t find this amusing.
The sender is now having to navigate a minefield. This raises the cost
to the point where getting an actual delivery would be cheaper by the use
of snail mail.
The rejection mechanism is the same as publishing in general: the sender
may not know why it was rejected, but they keep trying until some strategy
is successful. Such strategies might include humor, information content,
desirable products and services, or simply a reputation among recipients
of having properly targeted proposals. Effective feedback forces the spammer
to constructively differentiate on the product axis, distill their audience
list on the prospect axis, and creatively package their message on the
marketing axis. The ‘cheap shot’ business disappears, the only people that
stand a chance are those that know what the consumer community is interested
in right now. Since that is mercurial, e-mail marketers have to stay on
their toes.
What makes this work is the aggregate voice of the receivers. You can
block messages with particular rules, but you don’t know what other people
are blocking and vice versa. This knowledge needs to be pooled. The filter
mask then migrates ‘upstream’ to the points of origin. A lot of computing
is involved in making this work. However, as we have noticed recently,
computing costs are trivial compared to the time wasted by people holding
their fingers in the dike.
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